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H E N R Y  A .  W I S E  A N D  T HE  P R E S I D E N C Y
By J. E. DAVIS YONGE
Henry A. Wise was never elected to the presi-
dency, he was never nominated as a candidate for
that office, his name was never brought before a
nominating convention of his party and yet his con-
nection with the presidency is interesting. The im-
mediate occasion for the secession of the Southern
States was the election of Lincoln, and in all prob-
ability he would not have been elected had the two
factions of the Democratic party been united-in the
election of 1860. Among the many aspirants for
the Democratic nomination the only one on whom the
party could have united was Henry A. Wise of Vir-
ginia. Had his political views been rightly under-
stood by the men of his own party, he might have
united his party and by defeating Lincoln would have
postponed secession for at least four years.
The question at issue in the presidential election
of 1860 was the existence of slavery in the territories
of the United States. The controversy over this
question began before the adoption of the constitu-
tion with the ordinance for the government of the
Northwest Territory in 1787. Its settlement was
attempted by the Missouri compromise in 1820 and
by the compromise of 1850, but in 1854 it was still
unsettled and from that time until 1860 it was the
predominating question in the politics of the country.
When the United States acquired New Mexico and
California by the treaty at the close of the Mexican
war, territorial governments for them were proposed
Note-This paper is based in part upon a number of letters
written by Wise to W. F. Samford, of Alabama, during the decade
prior to the War. The originals are in the possession of Dr.
George Petrie, Professor of History and Dean of the Graduate
School, Alabama Polytechnic Institute; and it was on his sug-
gestion that the paper was written, some years ago, soon after
the letters were brought to light. - Ed.
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in Congress. This afforded another occasion for the
discussion of the slavery question which was con-
tinued until compromised in 1850 by the establish-
ment of the principle of non-intervention by Con-
gress with slavery in the new territories. The com-
promise of 1850 had applied the principle of non-
intervention only to the territory newly acquired
from Mexico. When the discussion was reopened by
the Kansas-Nebraska bill in 1854 this principle was
extended to the old Louisiana territory and a step
further was taken in establishing popular sovereign-
ty, that is the people of a territory were given the
right to decide for or against slavery.
In 1854, then, the leading political question of the
day was slavery in the territories and the events of
the next few years increased its importance. The
bitter struggle between the slavery and anti-slavery
parties in Kansas for the control of that territory
forced the question on the attention of the public.
The Dred Scott decision encouraged the South by
acknowledging its claims in a Supreme Court de-
cision and strengthened the Free-soilers by making
them unite to oppose it. By 1860 this question over-
shadowed all others and was the one important is-
sue in the presidential election of that year.
In this election the principal parties were the
Democrats and the Free-soilers or Republicans. The
latter had grown rapidly in strength during the de-
cade preceding the war by the acquisition of both
Democrats and Whigs. Its fundamental principle
was opposition to the extention of slavery. They
declared in their-platform of 1860 that they had no
intention of interfering with slavery in the states
where it already existed, but confined themselves to
opposing its extention into the territories. They
declared : “that the normal condition of all the ter-
ritory of the United States is that of freedom”, and
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that Congress had the power to abolish slavery there,
and should do so when necessary. The right which
the South claimed of protection for slaves in the
territories, they denounced as “dangerous political
heresy’ and denied the authority of Congress or of
a territorial legislature or of any individuals to give
legal existence to slavery in any territory of the
United States.
The Democratic party had united in 1856 on the
Cincinnati platform which affirmed the principle of
non-intervention, established by the Kansas-Nebras-
ka bill. During the four years of Buchanan’s ad-
ministration different constructions had been placed
on this platform by different parts of the Democrat-
ic party, and by 1860 two well defined factions had
developed-the Northern or Douglas faction and
the Southern-rights faction.
The Northern faction, led by Senator Stephen A.
Douglas of Illinois, believed that the question of
slavery in a territory should not be decided at all
by Congress, but that a territorial legislature could
establish or abolish slavery. This was soon brought
face to face with the decision of the Supreme Court
in the Dred Scott case which stated clearly that
neither Congress nor the territorial legislature had
the right to abolish slavery in a territory. In order
not to directly oppose a decision of the Supreme
Court in the presidential campaign of 1860, they
avoided committing themselves to either position by
declaring in their platform that since there were
differences of opinion regarding slavery in the ter-
ritories "the Democratic party would abide by de-
cisions of the Supreme Court on questions of con-
stitutional law.”
The Southern-rights wing still favored the popu-
lar sovereignty of the Cincinnati platform, but
claimed that the people of a territory could exercise
3
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this right only in forming a state constitution and
not before.
At the Charleston Convention this wing of the
Democrats objected to the Northern wing platform
because it. took no definite position on the slavery
question. They demanded a platform making a
clear statement in favor of protection.
Besides the new Free-soil element and the two fac-
tions of the Democratic party, there was still to be
reckoned with the remnants of the American or
Know-nothing party. In 1856 this party had showed
considerable strength under the principles of oppo-
sition to foreigners and Roman Catholics and neu-
trality on the slavery question, but now only a rem-
nant of its old members formed the Constitutional
Union party with the policy of neutrality on the
slavery question. It had no chance of winning the
election and was feared chiefly by the Southern
Democrats who thought that it might break the
solid Democratic South by winning some of the
Southern states. It was generally conceded up to a
few months before the Republican convention that
William H. Seward would be the choice of the Free-
soil party. Therefore the Democrats would have to
select a nominee who would be especially strong
against him. But the question as to who this Demo-
cratic nominee should be was answered in various
ways. As the party was divided in principle and
could unite on no platform, so they could agree on no
candidate. Douglas was in the field representing the
Northern wing ; Buchanan, who desperately sought
to please both sections, was a candidate for re-elec-
tion ; and Henry A. Wise of Virginia was the most
prominently mentioned Southern man.
Stephen A. Douglas had no rival in his faction. He
had introduced into Congress in the Kansas-Nebras-
ka bill the doctrine of popular sovereignty which
4
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was the foundation of his policy and had continued
its persistent champion. He claimed that this prin-
ciple had been established in the compromise meas-
ures of 1850 and should be applied thereafter in the
formation of all territorial governments. He under-
stood popular sovereignty in the sense of squatter
sovereignty, that. is, that during the territorial period
the people of a territory through its legislature
might establish or prohibit slavery. When the Dred
Scott decision contradicted the doctrine of squatter
sovereignty by stating that neither Congress nor the
territorial legislature could interfere with slavery,
Douglas was compelled to state his position anew
and he attempted to please both sections. To the
South he said that the decision of the court was
supreme and must be obeyed. To the North he said
that though the decision of the court was supreme
and forbade the territorial legislature to abolish
slavery, yet by refusing to protect it by necessary
police regulations the legislature might make the ex-
istence of slavery impossible. This answer lost him
the support of the South because it did not uphold
protection.
Buchanan had been elected in 1856 on the Cincin-
nati platform which endorsed the Kansas-Nebraska
bill. It affirmed the principle of non-intervention,
but on the question of popular sovereignty it was
ambiguous and probably intentionally so in order
that both wings might interpret it to suit themselves.
During his administration Buchanan had done all in
his power to keep in favor with both factions and
hence had attempted to avoid committing himself
to the views of either.
Between these two presidential aspirants, Douglas
and Buchanan, there was a personal antagonism
which had sprung from a difference of opinion on
popular sovereignty and chiefly on the Lecomption
5
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question. Buchanan had been in favor of the ad-
mission of Kansas under the Lecomption constitu-
tion and had tried in every way to have Congress ac-
cept it, but he had been opposed by Douglas to whose
efforts the defeat of this plan was mainly due.
While Douglas and Buchanan each had claims on
one section of the Democratic party, there was reason
to believe that both wings might unite on Henry A.
Wise. On the question of most importance, that of
slavery in the territories he was extremely Southern,
taking very advanced ground. He was one of the
earliest and most ardent supporters of the doctrine
of protection. As early as 1854 when it had hardly
been discussed at all he opposed the Kansas-Ne-
braska bill because one of its clauses provided
against reviving a law protecting slavery. On this
point his friend Col.  W. F. Samford of Alabama
writes on Dec. 28, 1858,
Gov. Wise has taken higher ground on the territorial question
than any other presidential aspirant North or South. While
Douglas, Davis, Orr and Stephens have been ducking, diving,
dodging and hiding and openly declaring in favor of the power
of a territorial legislature to exclude slavery by refusing to it the
“peculiar” protection and “police regulations” necessary to its
maintainance in a territory, or anywhere else, Henry A. Wise
stands up boldly and declares for the South without reservation
or equivocation. He says the territorial legislature, no more than
Congress. has the right to exclude or to cripple the institution in
anyway; or to any extent but, on the contrary, are bound by the
Constitution and the law, as declared by the Supreme Court, to
protect slavery just as they are bound to protect any other prop-
erty, and to give that sort and degree of protection which its
peculiar nature demands. The Kansas act bad a double-side
which many of us did not see in 1856, but which we may be made
to feel in 1860, and ever thereafter. Out of this has come a doc-
trine absurd in theory and ruinous to the South in practice. It is
this: That Congress and the President shall not interfere to pro-
tect any more than to destroy slavery in the territories or states.
This is the very genius and spirit of the Kansas Act, and an evil
spirit it is for the South. I did not see this consequence of the
Act in 1856, my eye rested on the repeal of the Missouri Restric-
tion, and I little dreamed that in 1858, that Act would be claimed
as establishing the doctrine, that the South has no right to Pro-
tection of her property from this Federal Government in the ter-
ritories or States.
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I know Gov. Wise was originally opposed to the Act with the
Badger Proviso, and suspicious of its operations and he stands
today among the presidential aspirants, the only man who from
the beginning, has asserted the right of the South to have her
property protected in the territories.
Gov. Wise approved of the repeal of the Missouri
Compromise but he opposed the Kansas-Nebraska
bill because of the Badger amendment which pro-
vided against the revival of any law protecting or
establishing, prohibiting or abolishing slavery.
Without this proviso, he claimed, the old Spanish
law of the Louisiana territory protecting slavery
would have been revived. On Aug. 6th, 1857, he
writes to Samford:
I happened unfortunately to agree with my friend Mr. Wilson
in opposition to the Kansas-Nebraska bill. The Dred Scott deci-
sion proves too late our sagacity. The law of slavers was the
law of the Louisiana territory, N and S. of 36o 30’, prior to 1820.
It was unrepealed, up to the Kansas Act, by any law other than
that of the law and line of the Missouri compromise. That com-
promise was constitutional or unconstitutional. If constitutional,
it affected only the territory N. of 36o 30’ - that S. of it was left
unaffected. In other words slavery was the status south of
36o 30’ in Kansas. But for the Kansas bill, the Dred Scott de-
cision would have established that the compromise law of 1820
was void and that the old Spanish law of slavery was untouched,
unrepealed north of 36o 30’ in all the Louisiana territory not or-
ganized into a state government. What did the K-N bill? By a
proviso twice repeated in the 14th Section and in the 32nd Section
it enacted : “that nothing herein contained shall be construed to
revive or put in force any law prior to 1820 either protecting or
establishing, prohibiting or abolishing slavery.” There was no
law prior to 1820 prohibiting or abolishing, but there was a law
establishing and protecting slavery in Kansas and that law this
proviso repealed. How can they who repealed slavery in Kansas
abuse Walker for saying, it is, or it will be a free state. I was
at Washington when the amendment passed and protested against
it. It came from that Danaos Badger. Stewart of Michigan pro-
tested against the revival of slavery north of 36o 30’ and Badger,
superservicably, instead of confining the proviso to north of 36o
30’ which, true, would have been only to reenact the Missouri
compromise law and line made it sweeping South and North, not
only to revive, but also not to "put in force” the Louisiana ter-
ritorial law establishing and protecting slavery. In a clause of
non-intervention it intervened to discriminate “between all other
property and slavery and repealed the law, the only law establish-
ing-and protecting slavery.
As Wise favored protection he necessarily op-
posed squatter sovereignty because to sanction squat-
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ter sovereignty would be to admit that a territorial
legislature could prohibit slavery, and according to
his doctrine of protection it not only could not pro-
hibit but must protect it. In a speech delivered at
Norfolk during the campaign of 1860 he said,
The only difference between Lincoln and Douglas is that Lincoln
claims the power and duty of Congress to abolish slavery in the
territories, and Douglas practices intervention and preaches non-
, intervention by Congress, but claims that a territorial legislature,
a mere creature of Congress, a most subordinate Federal authori-
ty, can intervene to abolish property in slaves. It is safer for us
to contest the power in Congress, we can’t risk our slaves to con-
test it in the territories. In Congress we are represented and in
Kansas Legislature we can’t be.
During July of 1859 Gov. Wise received a letter
from a body of New York Democrats asking his
views on the leading questions of the day, as his
“name had been prominently brought before the
American people of the Democratic party, both in
this section and in other quarters of the Union as
their choice for the nomination of the Charleston
convention as a candidate for the Presidency”. In
a lengthy reply Gov. Wise explained his views on
naturalization, on protection abroad for naturalized
citizens, on the powers of a state relating to natural-
ization, on the reopening of the slave trade and no
protection in the territories. On the last point he
said,
You ask my views also regarding the legitimate bounds of con-
gressional legislation, which, while maintaining non-intervention on
the question of forcing or excluding slavery from them, yet should
claim the constitutional power if necessary to protect the rights
of persons and property within their borders, leaving the people
free at the proper time to form a state constitution and seek ad-
mission in the Union, whether Free or Slave states as they may
elect.
This question in itself, in the shortest space states my views
in substance with precision. All persons and all property, equal
and alike, require only not to be assailed and destroyed in, or
excluded from the common territories. Every species of right
require laws, it is true, suited to their character and their case.
Personal property for example must have a law that it shall not
be “taken and carried away” ; and land which cannot be “taken
and carried away” must have a law that it shall not be trespassed
8
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upon in some other way, and so with slaves and everything else,
they must have provisions according to their kind. But the Con-
stitution of the United States and the laws of Congress heretofore
organizing territories are sufficient, and if amendments of the laws
are required, it is the duty of Congress to see that they are pro-
vided, of the Executive of the United States to see that they are
executed and the Judiciary to decide upon the rights under the
laws. The Slave states should never pretend to any peculiar privi-
leges and do not so far as I know. They ask only that their rights
shall not be assailed and invaded and, if they be assailed, that
they may be protected as other personal and proprietary rights
are protected; that they may have equal confederate, federal
privileges and immunities, and they ask for no special or peculiar
code. The sole question is: What protection does the Constitu-
tion guarantee in the territories ? We contend that it guarantees.
all protection required, to all persons and all rights recognized
within its jurisdicton.
When the issue of popular sovereignty was made to leave the
people perfectly free to form their state constitution, without
force, fraud, or dictation or intervention from Congress or any
other power, I declared openly for the sovereignty of the people,
But I am utterly opposed to “squatter sovereignty” and hostile to
the cry of “no code” for the sake of protection-and utterly op-
posed to the equally vicious doctrine lately put forth: “That the
Congress may renounce its powers and duties of protection”.
On reopening the Slave Trade, Wise said in this
same letter,
I can easily defend the slavery of the United States as it now
exists and has existed from first to last, and show that it is now,
at least, well founded on principles wholly opposed to the re-open-
ing of African Slave trade; that the one is wholly irreconcilable
with and opposed to the other; and that the reopening of the
slave trade would be as offensive to the moral sense of the large
majority of slave-holders and of the people of the South as to any
other people in our own or in any other country.
This advanced Southern-rights ground taken by
Wise, demanding protection for slaves in the terri-
tories, gave him great strength with the Southern
wing of the Democrats but his bold stand against the
Lecomption constitution on account of its injustice
was entirely misunderstood and lost for him the sup-
port to which he was entitled and which his position
on protection alone would have given him. He claim-
ed that the power to ratify the Lecomption constitu-
tion had not been delegated by the people of Kansas.
to the convention which framed it, but had been re-
9
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served to the people themselves, and that therefore,
since only one section of it had been ratified by them,
the constitution as a whole was not the act and deed
of the people. He believed “that the inhabitants or
people of a territory are sovereign to form for them-
selves a constitution and State Government”, and as
this constitution was not the act and deed of the in-
habitants he thought it was neither right nor just to
force it upon them.
Besides opposing it on the ground of its injustice
he said also that there was no advantage in its being
adopted. In 1858 he wrote,
And why impose this constitution of a minority on a majority?
Cui bono? Does any Southern man imagine that this is a prac-
ticable or sufferable way of making a Slave State? Who believes
that Kansas will be made a Slave State or kept one for any time
by the admission of this constitution? Who will carry a slave there
now to become a bone of contention in a border war? The sport
of violence and fraud and force like that which has so long en-
dangered person and property and political franchise in that un-
happy battle ground of sectional feuds? To what end is this to
be done if speedily it is to be undone with State authority, created
to drive slave property from the territory?
We have proudly, heretofore, contended only for equality and
justice; but if this be wantonly done without winning a stake-
the power of a slave state, thereby-it will be worse than vain.
It will be snatching power per fas aut nefas, to be lost "speedily”
with the loss of something of far more worth than political votes,
our moral prestige.
On the ground of justice then and of expediency,
Wise opposed the Lecomption constitution and
thought that Congress should reject it and send it
back to the people of Kansas. He denied the right of
Congress to alter it in any way, claiming that this
power belonged only to the people of the territory.
If anything within it made it inadmissible then it
was not the duty of Congress to change it but simply
send it back to the people who might change it or
not as they chose. On his Lecomption policy he
wrote in 1859 to Samford,
My dear Sir: My position was-That Congress must either
accept or reject the proposition of the people to be admitted as a
10
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state. This would depend upon two questions-1st: Is the propo-
sition in form, the act and deed of the people, legally and in due
form expressed. 2nd: If so, is its form Republican, and are its
terms and conditions admissible.
To ascertain these inquiries we were not to go behind the re-
turns. The return was the Schedule or Ordinance. Did it show on
its face that it was not Republican, or that its conditions were
inadmissible?
I contended that it showed both. What then? That Congress
was to send it back to the people to be voted on by them as it
might prescribe? No. On the contrary, that Congress was not to
intervene for any such purpose, but was simply to admit or reject
the state. If for either reason above it rejected, the matter was
to be left to the people or their Legislature in the territory to
order a new convention and form another constitution or not as
to them might seem proper, without dictation or prescription from
Congress. That Congress could not, in justice or reason, adopt
the Lecomption Schedule, and if it did not that it was obliged to
reject the proposition after being obliged from its own nature to
change it. That if Congress changed the terms of the proposi-
tion, it went back rejected of its own nature, and not referred
back rightfully to be voted on.
Because Wise opposed the admission of Kansas
under the Lecomption constitution, and thus failed
to take advantage of an opportunity to bring a slave
state into the Union he was accused by many South-
ern Democrats of deserting his principles and his
party.
In opposing the adoption of the Lecomption con-
stitution, Wise and Douglas occupied the same posi-
tion. They both opposed it on the ground that it
violated the right of the people to form their own
state government in that it had not been voted on by
them. The questions on which these two men differ-
ed, protection and squatter sovereignty, were not in-
volved. Wise’s agreement with Douglas on this
question brought him into favor with the Northern
Democrats.
Each of Wise’s positions on the slavery question
brought him into favor with some faction of his
party. His advanced position on protection and his
support of the Dred Scott decision gained him favor
in the South. His opposition to the Lecomption con-
stitution brought him into favor with Northern Dem-
11
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ocrats but was entirely misunderstood at the South
and brought him into disfavor there. If the South-
ern-rights men could have seen that he was simply
acting on principles of justice in not wishing to
force the Lecomption constitution on Kansas, if
they could have seen that they would lose nothing by
his policy since Kansas must necessarily become a
free state, they would have supported him and it is
probable that the whole party would have united on
him as a candidate in 1860.
Whatever differences there might be on these
questions there was none as to his success in over-
throwing the Know-nothing party. Fro-m time to
time there had been feeling in favor of a Nativist
or American party but the first one of any impor-
tance was formed in 1852. The fundamental prin-
ciple of this party, opposition to foreigners and Ro-
man Catholics, was strongly objected to by Wise,
and besides he protested against the secrecy with
which all its actions were covered. The solemn oaths,
the passwords, the initiation ceremonies, he said,
did not properly belong to a political party all of
whose actions should be open and above board. In
1854 he wrote concerning this party to a committee
of Virginia citizens,
Here is proposed a great primary, national organization, in its
inception--What? Nobody knows. How organized? Nobody knows.
Governed by whom? Nobody knows. How bound? By what rites?
By what test oaths? With what limitations and restrictions? No-
body, nobody knows ! ! ! All we know is that persons of foreign
birth and Catholic faith are proscribed, and so are all others who
don’t proscribe them at the polls. This is certainly against the
spirit of magno chasta. I am an American in every fibre, and in
every feeling an American; yet in every character, in every rela-
tion, in every sense, with all my head and all my heart, and all
my might, I protest against this secret organization of Native
Americans and of protestants to proscribe Roman Catholics and
naturalized citizens !
The American party had gained rapidly in
strength partly on account of disruption of the Whig
12
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party, and by 1855 had succeeded in carrying many
states in the North. Though not so far advanced in
the South it was increasing in strength in that sec-
tion and bid fair to continue to do so, especially as
one of its principles was opposition to the agitation
of the slavery question. The first real test of this
party in the South was the election for Governor in
Virginia, in 1855. Wise was the Democratic candi-
date and his only opponent was the Know-nothing
nominee. At the beginning of the campaign the out-
look was unfavorable for Wise, for his opponents
were strong and well organized and he was not the
unanimous choice of his party. However, he took
the stump in an aggressive campaign and by his elo-
quence, his logic and his enthusiasm he raised his
party from despair and succeeded in defeating his
opponents. The eyes of the whole country were
turned on this election and its result was watched
with keenest interest. This defeat of the Know-
nothings marked the beginning of the decline of their
power and the credit for it was universally given to
Wise.
When the name of Henry A. Wise was before the
country for the nomination for the presidency in
1860, he claimed the support of the party on account
of his past record. As we have seen, he claimed the
support of the whole party because of his campaign
against the Know-nothings; that of the Southern-
rights faction because of his position on protection;
and that of the Northern wing because of his position
on Lecomption. Besides his past record his striking
personality would also have been a factor greatly in
his favor. He was known to be a man of bold, fear-
less and determined character. He cared little for
public opinion. His doctrines were clear and it was
generally believed that he would unhesitatingly put
them into practice. In speech he was eloquent and
13
Yonge: Henry A. Wise and the Presidency
Published by STARS, 1934
78
persuasive, and in a campaign tireless and aggres-
sive and in a presidential contest he would certainly
make himself popular.
Of his own nomination Wise was at times very
hopeful. In a letter to Samford under the date Nov.
3rd, 1858, he says, “Douglas would not consent to be
Vice. He would regard the offer as an insult. Let
him run his line out and he will then be obliged to
come to me. I will leave him no excuse. I have
every evidence of more strength in the North than
he has. ’’ On July 7th, 1859, he writes, "The Letcher
nomination and election have made me in Virginia
invincible. We will go to Charleston a unit deter-
mined on a platform of protection.” Though he
had hoped for Pennsylvania’s support, on July 24th,
1859, he writes, “The Herald says my chance is gone
since the Enquirer’s savage attack on the adminis-
tration and a Pittsburgh paper openly announces
Mr. Buchanan for re-election and that Pennsylvania
is rabid against me”. On Jan. 27th, 1859, he writes,
“You have hoisted my flag. Well I owe you more
than I can ever pay for the motive. I fear Distrac-
tion rules the hour and a Black Republican will be
the next president. ’’
At the National Democratic convention in 1852
Wise led the Virginia delegation. After voting for
Buchanan for some time, he persuaded his delega-
tion to support Pierce and won the nomination for
him. In 1856 Wise was prominently mentioned for
the presidency, being supported by Buchanan. Fi-
nally he lent his influence to Buchanan and procured
him the nomination, it is claimed, by giving him Vir-
ginia’s vote.
In his own state Wise had never failed to secure
an election and as has been shown he had a great in-
fluence over the delegations of his party to the Na-
tional conventions. In 1860, he expected the vote
14
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of Pennsylvania for his own nomination. As Vir-
ginia had voted for Buchanan, Pennsylvania’s can-
didate, so he thought Pennsylvania should vote now
for Virginia‘s choice.
In writing to a Mr. Donnely of New York concern-
ing his chances for securing the New York delega-
tion at Charleston Wise said, “Our only chance is to
organize by districts and either whip the enemy or
send two delegations.” This letter, though private,
got into print and was copied in the newspapers
throughout the country, and Wise was severely criti-
cised for this paragraph. He was accused of desert-
ing the regular party machine and of resorting to
intrigues to win the New York delegation.
He believed that the time had come for the South
to stand for her rights and to accept no more com-
promises or ambiguous platforms. Concerning the
action of the South in the coming convention, he
wrote, July lst, 1859,
You must decide! 1st: To go into no nomination without a
platform satisfactory first. 2nd: To take no platform which don’t
aver the principle of protection, or exclude the contrary conclu-
sion. 3rd : If we can’t get the principle, not to be responsible for
the nomination. 4th: If the nominee is not trustworthy on our
principles, to come out and appeal to an independent Democratic
conservative nomination.
In order that the South might. control the con-
vention and carry out his plan, he wished that votes
in the convention be taken according to Democratic
strength. On this point he wrote,
We can hold them to our man by forcing them : 1st; Either to
Scale states according to Democratic or Non-Democratic strength.
Or 2nd: To adopt the rule that a majority of the convention
carrying two-thirds Democratic states; or 3rd : two-third of
convention, carrying a majority of Democratic states-shall make
a nomination. This, with the Dred Scott decision will do. I
would abide by a nomination thus made. But, if we get no fair
mode of nomination, no reliable man, no just programme of prin-
ciples, what are we to do? Secede as armed neutrals? I have no
compromise with anyone that you may rely on.
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Wise’s name was never brought before the
Charleston convention. The Virginia Democratic
convention in sending delegates to Charleston had
expressed no preference for any candidate, and in
April, 1860, Wise wrote for the press,
Whomever else the preference has been expressed for, it has
not been expressed for me. Without the voice of Virginia clearly
and indisputably declared for me, I decline to allow my name to be
presented primarily before the convention for a nomination. In
no event am I willing that it shall cause any division of the vote
of our delegation. I beg my friends therefore not to offer my name,
but to unite cordially with the majority of the delegation and to
present the vote of the state a unit before the convention.
He gave his support to Breckenridge and Lane but
thought they never had any real chance. After the
Democratic party had failed to unite at Charleston,
Wise saw that Lincoln’s election was certain. He
thought that under the Republican administration
the rights of the South under the constitution would
be utterly disregarded, and therefore in his usual
fearless way he called for immediate action, he did
not wish to wait for the election, he did not advocate
secession but demanded that the South prepare for
war within the union to protect her rights.
Nobody South is going to be led into Revolution, and you and I
won’t shame men enough into resistance to be led into halters; I
have thought so for years. I snuff “tyranny itself in the tainted
breezes” of Pennsylvania and Indiana elections. They show that
Lincoln’s election is certain in event and certain in effect too ! It
will be an avowal at the polls that the past agressions upon us
are justified by the North :-that they will be persisted in and
aggravated : that whilst territories west may govern themselves as
they please, Southern states will be inhibited from regulating their
own domestic institutions for themselves: that we shall be civil-
ly disfranchised, and socially and morally revolutionized. Now
would-ought any sovereign and independent people upon earth
to be thus threatened without instantly flying to arms? It is
actual though not declared war. The worse because it comes in
all the panoply of legal forms. The form is election, the election
is constitutional. That is the pore out of which the courage of
resistance will ooze. But in substance, in reality is it not aggres-
sion-war upon our very vitals ? The elections may be constitu-
tionally formal, but is the avowed object of the election not to
disturb our very social safety? Why then wait a moment in pre-
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venting the election giving all power of nationality into the hands
of the aggressors? If this view don’t prevail, none will with the
cowards and traitors who will submit servilely to be degraded.
"Overt Act” after “Overt Act” has come and may come a thou-
sand fold, iterated and intensified and they will submit. What
can we do? Appoint “committees of safety” and “minute men” as
in Revolutionary times. If masses and conventions won’t, let the
few who will, meet and arm-and, if they can do no more alarm.
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